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TERM OF THE COURT
water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not
subject to liability for interference with the use of water by an-
other, unless
(a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm
through lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) The ground water forms an underground stream, in
which case the rules stated in sec. 850A to 857 are applicable, or
(c) The withdrawal of water has a direct and substantial
effect upon the water of a watercourse or lake, in which case the
rules stated in secs. 850A to 857 are applicable.
Thus, the Restatement rule continues to recognize the right of
a property owner to utilize ground water without incurring liabil-
ity, but imposes certain limitations which appear enforceable, yet
flexible enough to apply fairly in a wide variety of circumstances.
ERIC J. VAN VUGT
TAXATION
I. TAXATION AND THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
After.only a very few years experience with the federal income
tax as originally enacted, legislators were made acutely aware of
the different tax results between married individuals living in sepa-
rate property states and those living in community property states.
Under the community property theory, all income earned by mar-
ried couples was split equally between them. Naturally the tax
burden was considerably lower than that sustained in separate
property states where one party earned all or substantially more
of the income than the other. The remedy for such unequal taxa-
tion was to adopt income splitting in the form of the joint return
as part of the Internal Revenue Code.' The joint return affords
similar treatment to married individuals respective of state law.2
A. Income Splitting
Prior to 1965, income taxation in Wisconsin made no reference
to the federal tax base. The Wisconsin Legislature enacted an
income tax "simplification law' 3 in July of 1965 which provided
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
2. McClure v. United States, 228 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1955).
3. Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 163.
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that Wisconsin income tax would be calculated using federal taxa-
ble income as a basis, with some modifications. The legislature,
holding firmly to separate property principles, did not extend the
advantages of income splitting to married individuals for Wiscon-
sin income tax purposes.
One obvious way to obtain the same advantages as those pro-
vided by a joint return was to form a husband-wife partnership. In
Skaar v. Department of Revenue4 and Stern v. Department of
Revenue,5 the taxpayers tried unsuccessfully to argue for the exist-
ence of such a partnership. The two cases were factually similar.
In Skaar, the parties operated a farm which they held in joint
ownership. The husband had a salaried job in addition to his farm
duties. The wife kept all the financial records for both the farm and
nonfarm operations, in addition to performing her half of the farm
duties. The taxpayers contended they had an oral partnership
agreement to share all profits and losses equally. However, some
of the personal property was registered in the husband's name, and
the insurance had also been taken out in his name only. They did
not file partnership tax returns nor did they pay social security
taxes for Mrs. Skaar. In Stern, the situation was similar. There
was joint ownership of the business property and the business lia-
bilities, and each party had made a capital contribution out of their
own separate property. Both parties shared the work and felt justi-
fied in sharing the income. However, there was no formal partner-
ship agreement, no partnership tax return filed, and no social secu-
rity payments made in Mrs. Stern's name. In both cases the su-
preme court held that the arrangements were based on the sharing
inherent in the marital relationship, rather than upon any formal
partnership relationship.
While the supreme court indicated that it would prefer the
federal system as it applies to married individuals, a change to such
a system was considered a matter for the legislature. At the same
time the court noted that it had ruled in Amerpohl v. Tax
Commission' that Wisconsin's income tax provisions regarding
joint returns were unconstitutional as written. Since 1937, the legis-
lature has failed to enact a constitutional provision for filing joint
returns. As a result of Skaar and Stein, it would appear that tax-
4. 61 Wis. 2d 93, 211 N.W.2d 642 (1973), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1611
(1974).
5. 63 Wis. 2d 506, 217 N.W.2d 326 (1974).
6. 225 Wis. 62, 272 N.W. 472 (1937).
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payers, as well as tax advisors, should argue the equities of joint
returns in the legislature and not the courts.
The federal system still has the problem faced by the court in
the instant cases because many individuals are aware of the advan-
tages of family partnerships which allow splitting income with
children and other relatives in lower tax brackets. The United
States Supreme Court has established the Culbertson7 test, where
the determinative factor is a bona fide intent to establish a partner-
ship by the family members, either because of services to be per-
formed or because of contributions of capital of which they are the
true owners. Using that test, the Internal Revenue Service has been
successful in challenging family partnerships even though no relia-
ble criteria have yet been developed for predictive purposes. Based
on the way the bona fide intent test has been applied under the
federal law, it is probably that the result in Skaar and Stern would
remain unchanged. This is true even though each party performed
significant services and, at least in Stern, each party made a capital
contribution from separate property. The lack of bona fide intent
could be found from inconsistent positions taken by the taxpayers,
i.e., partnership treatment on state returns to save tax dollars but
individual attribution for social security tax purposes.
Left unanswered by the Wisconsin court is the question of what
total evidence is required to establish a husband-wife partnership
for Wisconsin income tax purposes. The decision clearly infers that
a combination of the following would be sufficient: (a) the exist-
ence of formal partnership agreement; (b) the filing of partnership
information returns; (c) the paying of social security taxes for both
husband and wife; (d) sharing the actual work. This places a duty
on tax advisors to be aware of the possibility for tax savings by
using the husband-wife partnership form where it is appropriate.
It appears from the facts in both cases that the inequities in the
social security laws were the impetus for taking inconsistent posi-
tions on the partnership form of business. Tax reform in this area
is long overdue, but in the meantime every tax advisor must under-
stand the obligations imposed by these laws and must explain the
alternatives to his clients considering them both as a couple and
as individuals. The client's individual best interests will at times be
in direct conflict with their interests as a family.
7. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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B. Ownership of Tax Refunds
The ownership of federal income tax refunds must be deter-
mined by the property laws of the individual states under the ra-
tionale in Estate of Trecker.8 The decedent and his wife filed a joint
federal income tax return which resulted in a refund payable to
them jointly. The petitioner-wife contended that she was the sole
owner of the proceeds as the survivor to jointly-held property. The
estate inventoried the total, proceeds as solely owned property of
the estate.
Filing a joint federal return was a federally created right which
also resulted in a duty on those filing a joint return to be jointly
liable for any underpayment.' The Internal Revenue Code does not
include any language, however, which can be interpreted as show-
ing any intent to establish property rights in an overpayment. Thus
in Trecker, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that state law was
controlling on the issue of ownership.
The court reviewed and declined to find either a joint tenancy
or joint venture. The decision did not indicate that a tax refund was
per se separate property but dismissed the petitioner's claim for
lack of proof. Since there was no inference that the claim was
specious, joint ownership may be found in a proper case. No at-
tempt was made by the court to rationalize the inequities inherent
in this decision. The marital partner-in his or her individual ca-
pacity-who contributes no outside income appears in all cases to
have much more to lose than to gain by assenting to a joint return.
The ownership of any refund belongs solely to the spouse with
income while the liability for any underpayment falls upon either
party. 10
II. DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXPENSES INCURRED TO RESOLVE
MANAGEMENT STRIFE
Management strife is detrimental to the profit-making capabil-
ities of any company, but its 
TERM OF THE COURT
was divided into two factions, the Soref group wanting to make
innovative changes in the conduct of the business and the Stahl
group being content with the status quo. With the death of one of
the directors, the board was evenly divided and deadlocked. As a
result, it was determined that the corporate taxpayer would pur-
chase the stock of the Stahl group, leaving the Soref group in
control. To effect the purchase, the Sorefs hired legal counsel to
draw up the agreements and caused the corporate taxpayer to
borrow money for the impending purchase. In its tax returns for
1964, the year of the purchase, the corporation deducted the inter-
est payments and the legal expenses. Likewise in the years follow-
ing, the corporation deducted interest payments on the loan. The
Department of Revenue contended that the expenditures were not
deductible under Wisconsin Statute section 71.04(2)12 and section
Tax 3.20 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. 3
Two rules of law had application to the facts of the case. First,
if the purchase is equivalent to no more than a readjustment of
internal affairs, i.e., a realignment of the interests of the individual
stockholders, the interest on the debt is not deductible because it
does not relate to the operations of the business from which the
corporate income is derived.14 Second, if the stock purchase is
related to the income production of a corporation, the interest is
12. Wis. STAT. § 71.04:
Deductions from gross income of corporations. Every corporation, joint stock
company or association shall be allowed to make from its gross income the following
deductions:
(2) Other ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of
the income in the maintenance and operation of its business and property, including
with respect to the calendar year 1963 and corresponding fiscal years and prior
calendar and fiscal years, but not thereafter a reasonable allowance for depreciation
by use, wear and tear of property from which the income is derived; and in the cases
of mines and quarries an allowance for depletion of ores and other natural deposits
on the basis of their actual original cost in cash or the equivalent of cash; and
including also interest and rent paid during the year in the operation of the business
from which its income is derived; provided, the payor reports the amount so paid,
together with the names and addresses of the parties to whom interest or rent was
paid as provided in s. 71.10(l).
13. 8 Wis. ADM. CODE, Rule Tax 3.20:
Interest paid by corporations. (Section 71.04(2), Wis. Stats.) Interest paid on
money borrowed by a corporation to purchase its own capital stock is not deductible.
14. Basic Products Corp. v. Department of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 183, 186, 120 N.W.2d
161 (1963); Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Department of Taxation, 268 Wis. 271, 276, 67
N.W.2d 294 (1954); and Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm., 202 Wis. 355, 363, 229 N.W. 646, 233 N.W. 72 (1930).
19751
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
deductible. 5 Factually, Master Lock fits within both rules, because
the stockholder interests were realigned and the company opera-
tions significantly improved. While the court did not cite the fig-
ures set forth in the appellant's brief, 6 it stated that:
The true interest of the state of Wisconsin is served by permitting
deductions from gross income when those deductions serve the
purpose of preserving the corporate entity in such a manner that
it may in the future continue to produce income that will be
taxable by the state of Wisconsin.'" -.
Determining deductibility is complicated because there are no
precise guidelines to follow. Hopefully the test in Master Lock will
be helpful since it incorporates both of the previously exclusive
concepts. In the future, "a deduction will be allowed where a stock
realignment is effected by a corporate purchase of its own stock
when it is for the purpose of preserving the income producing
capacity of the corporation."'1 7 The supreme court looked to fed-
eral law and found the rationale in Mountain State Steel Found-
ries, Inc. v. Commissioner5 persuasive.'9 There it was stated:
When the stockholders have such conflicting interests, the
corporation and its future are necessarily affected. When the
situation results in demands that the business be sold or liqui-
dated, as it did here, the impact of the conflict upon the corpora-
tion is direct and immediate. . . .The resolution of such a con-
flict, so that the need of the corporation may govern managerial
decision, is plainly a corporate purpose.
Thus the treatment of the cost of purchases of the corporation's
own stock will be similarly treated under federal and Wisconsin tax
laws.
15. Hoffman Co. v. Department of Revenue, 51 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 186 N.W.2d 228
(1971).
16. In the three-year period immediately following the elimination of the controversy,
the unimpeded management of the Sorefs increased the profit of the taxpayer from
S3,590,896 in 1964 (the year of the controversy), to $5,219,671 or by approximately fifty
per cent notwithstanding the substantial additional interest costs here disputed, greatly
increased marketing and advertising expenses, and a substantial capital expansion program.
Appellant's Reply Brief, page 7.
16.1. 62 Wis. 2d at 727.
17. Id.
18. 284 F.2d 737, 745 (4th Cir. 1960).
19. The Wisconsin Corporate Franchise Tax was not "federalized" and respondent
argued against using federal law as a basis for the decision.
[Vol. 58
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III. APPORTIONMENT OF INCOME IN MULTISTATE OPERATIONS
Apportionment of income commonly refers to an apportion-
ment formula developed for income taxation"0 of multistate opera-
tions of "unitary" businesses.2' However, multistate operations of
unitary businesses can create apportionment difficulties where
other types of taxes are levied on the basis of income, for example,
a gross premium tax levied on insurance companies' income.
It is axiomatic that Wisconsin has the power to tax income
received or derived within the state, but generally has no power to
tax income received or derived outside the state. Naturally each
state involved in the multistate operations of a company wants to
claim its share of the taxable income. Theoretically, the "unitary"
business should have its income apportioned among the states in
such a manner that only 100 per cent of the total income is taxed,
just as though a separate entity was operating in each state. While
constitutional protections are available to stop gross inequities,
each state generally has its own apportionment formula which it
may apply when it has a sufficient nexus to satisfy due process. 2
Until there is a uniform apportionment formula among the
states,23 unitary businesses will continue to pay local income taxes
on more or less than 100 per cent of total income.
In National Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. State," Wisconsin
imposed a gross premiums tax25 on an unlicensed foreign "mail-
20. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(2) (1969) supplied the apportionment formula used in this case.
A new formula was subsequently substituted by Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 125, § 373.
21. A "unitary" business is one which functions as a single unit; Le., it is not divided
into a separate entity for each of the states in which it operates. See W. R. Authur & Co.
v. Department of Taxation, 18 Wis. 2d 225, 118 N.W.2d 168 (1962).
22. Note, Constitutional Law - Taxation - Sufficient Nexus to Satisfy Due Process of
Law, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 378.
23. See, Interstate Taxation Bill Goes to House Floor, 47 TAXES 400 (1969) for the
development of a uniform federal law.
24. 62 Wis. 2d 347, 215 N.W.2d 26 (1974).
25. Wis. STAT. § 201.42(1 l)(a) (1969):
(11) UNAUTHORIZED INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX. (a) Except as to premiums on
lawfully procured surplus lines insurance and premiums on independently procured
insurance on which a tax has been paid pursuant to sub (12), every unauthorized
insurer shall pay to the commissioner before March 1 next succeeding the calendar
year in which the insurance was so effectuated, continued or renewed a premium
receipts tax of 3 per cent of gross premiums charged for such insurance other than
marine insurance and a premium receipts tax of one-half of one per cent of gross
premiums charged for such marine insurance on subjects resident, located or to be
performed in this state. Such insurance on subjects resident, located or to be per-
formed in this state procured through negotiations or an application, in whole or in
part occurring or made within or from within or outside of this state or for which
1975]
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order" insurance company. The company paid the tax in order to
prevent additional penalties and in order to become licensed. The
taxpayer brought this action to recover the taxes paid on the basis
that the taxes imposed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate
commerce and deprived the taxpayer of property without due pro-
cess of law.
The taxpayer relied on a long line of cases ending with National
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue 6 to establish an insufficient
nexus with Wisconsin. In National Bellas Hess sales were made in
Illinois through the use of catalogues. There were no agents or
sales outlets in Illinois; the only connection with customers was by
mail or common carrier. The United States Supreme Court held
that National Bellas Hess had no physical presence within Illinois
sufficient to establish a nexus for imposing a use tax." However,
making sales of personal property through the mails rests on a
substantially different state interest test than selling insurance. The
Supreme Court made this clear in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,25 where it upheld jurisdiction asserted by California
over an insurance company which had done no business in Califor-
nia except for the one policy involved in the case. Thus, it is not
surprising that the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the necessary
minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction where National had
written substantial amounts of "mail-order" insurance with Wis-
consin residents. The traditional test has been whether a state has
provided benefits for which it can expect a contribution for a share
of the costs. Since Wisconsin provides a comprehensive regulatory
program enacted to protect all insurance companies-both li-
censed and unlicensed-conducting business within the state, as
premiums in whole or in part are remitted directly or indirectly from within or
outside of this state, shall be deemed to be insurance procured, or continued or
renewed in this state. The term 'premium' includes all premiums, membership fees,
assessments, dues and any other consideration for insurance. Such tax shall be in
lieu of all taxes and fire department dues. On default of any such unauthorized
insurer in the payment of such tax the insured shall pay the tax. If the tax prescribed
by this subsection is not paid within the time stated, the tax shall be increased by a
penalty of 25 per cent and by the amount of an additional penalty computed at the
rate of one per cent per month or any part thereof from the date such payment was
due to the date paid.
26. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
27. A use tax is generally imposed as a complement to the sales tax. Such tax is imposed
on any purchaser who consumes, stores or uses the property but must be collected by the
seller. The use tax applies where the sale is consummated outside the state and the sales
tax is not applicable. WIs. STAT. § 77.53.
28. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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well as to protect Wisconsin citizens, there is a sufficient basis for
Wisconsin to exact a tax on a "mail-order" insurer.
The constitutional issue of the case was decided in accordance
with the general rule that where a tax is not apportioned, it violates
the due process clause and is unconstitutional. Hence in National
Liberty Life Insurance Co. it was held that where Wisconsin ap-
plied the gross premium tax on the total premiums collected
whether from Wisconsin residents or not, the state went beyond the
limits of due process, even though it had jurisdiction over the
taxpayer. 9
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
American Motors Corp. v. Department of Revenue"0 was an
apportionment case, but the main issue has been mooted by subse-
quent revision of the apportionment formula.3' The case is worthy
of note, however, because of the collateral issue decided by the
supreme court as a matter of first impression.
American Motors Corporation sold all of its automobiles to a
subsidiary, American Motors Sales Corporation. The main offices
of American Motors and its subsidiary are in Detroit, Michigan,
and the contract was negotiated there incorporating historically
accepted prices and terms. The manufacturing is performed by
American Motors in Wisconsin and the automobiles are shipped
from Wisconsin on the directions of the Sales Corporation. The
Wisconsin Department of Revenue determined the income from
the overriding sales contract was derived in Wisconsin and taxable
here even though executed in Michigan. American Motors paid the
taxes when due and later filed refund claims. The supreme court
held that the sale was completed in Michigan and the income was
not taxable by Wisconsin. The claims for refund were granted.
However, the Department of Revenue had also made an assess-
ment against American Motors which could not be asserted be-
cause of the four-year statute of limitations. The state contended
that this amount could be set off against the refund due for the
barred year. The supreme court agreed.
Setoffs have long been recognized under the federal system
where the statute of limitations has otherwise barred assessment.
The United States Supreme Court in Lewis v. Reynolds32 stated:
29. See generally, Patty, State Premium Taxes on Mail Order Insurance Under the Due
Process Clause, 22 TAX LAWYER 363 (1969).
30. 64 Wis. 2d 337, 219 N.W.2d 300 (1974).
31. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 125, § 373.
32. 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932).
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Although the statute of limitations may have barred the assess-
ment and collection of any additional sum, it does not obliterate
the right of the United States to retain payments already received
when they do not exceed the amount which might have been
properly assessed and demanded.
The Wisconsin court did not address itself to the policy argu-
ment that the statute of limitations was enacted to provide a defi-
nite time after which a taxpayer need not be prepared to prove that
his tax returns were proper. The court in its decision has even
adopted the broadest possible definition of "transaction" which
opens the entire year when a refund claim is filed rather than
resticting the Department of Revenue to the narrow area covered
by the refund claim.
This decision brings the Wisconsin and federal views in line
with each other. This seems to be a desirable result from the stand-
point of tax advisors as well as taxpayers. In addition, where setoff
and recoupment 33 are both given similar treatment, it does not
matter whether the government or the taxpayer is the first to sue.
SANDRA L. DEGRAW
TORTS
I. NEGLIGENT LIABILITY
A. Architects' Negligence
In A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.' and Rosenthal
v. Kurtz2 the supreme court this term furnished a restatement of
the law of architects' tort liability.
A.E. Investment Corp. involved a claim by a sublessee seeking
damages for loss of past and future profits, loss of fixtures and
merchandise, and loss of goodwill, all resulting from defendant
architects' alleged negligence in designing and supervising con-
struction of a commercial building. Defendants argued that plain-
33. In the event the government has made an assessment for a year which is now barred
by the statute of limitations, the taxpayer can raise his claim for refund under the recoup-
ment theory. Thus the theory is the "mirror-image" of setoff. See, Rothensies v. Electric
Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
1. 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).
2. 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974).
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